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The act of God that will excuse the performance of a contract must be one rendering performance impossible. If it merely makes it difficult or undesirable, it is
not sufficient. Thus, where schools w-ere suspended on account of the prevalence
of small-pox, the teacher remaining ready to perform his contract, he was not, by
reason of such suspension, precluded from his right to compensation during such
period.

ERROR to Alpena.

Holmes d Carpenter, for plaintiff in error.
Turnbull & Me-Donald, for defendant in error.

DEWEY v. SCHOOL DISTRICT.

GRAVES, J.-The plaintiff was regularly hired by the district to
serve as a teacher in its public schools for ten months, for $130 per
month. He entered on his duties on the 2d of September, and
continued up to the 10th of December, at which time the district
officers closed the schools, on account of the prevalence of smallpox in the city, and kept them closed thereafter, for the same reason, until the 17th of March. They were then re-opened, and the.
plaintiff resumed his duties. He was subsequently hired for the
next school year, and his compensation was increased $100. The
district refused to pay him for the period of suspension, and he
brought this action to recover it.
The claim was resisted on two grounds: 1. That on the second
hiring it was mutually agreed that the addition of $100 to his compensation for incoming services should stand and be allowed and
accepted in full satisfaction for pay during the time in question;
and 2. That the suspension was the effect of an overruling necessity, or, in other words, the act of God, and that all parts of the
contract were suspended for the time being.
The circuit judge submitted to the jury both questions in a , ery
clear manner, and instructed them to find against the plaintifl, in
case they were satisfied the alleged compromise was in fact entered
into, or in case they should find that the small-pox was so prevalent
that it became obligatory on the board to close the schools as a
necessary step to prevent the spread of the disease and save human
life. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the district; but we
cannot know with legal certainty whether they determined only one
of these questions in favor of the district, or whether they so determined both, and, of course, if one only was so decided, it is impossible
to say which one. The evidence on the compromise was conflicting, and, as it appears in the record, the advantage was with the
plaintiff. Still, if no other ground of defence had been laid, the
verdict must have been conclusive. As just explained, it is not
so now.
The second objection must be briefly considered. Beyond controversy, the closing of the schools was a wise and timely expedient;
but the defence interposed cannot rest on that. It must appear
that observance of the contract by the district was caused to be
impossible by act of God. It is not enough that great difficulties
were encountered, or that there existed urgent and satisfactory
reasons for stopping the schools; but this is all the evidence
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tended to show. The contract between the parties was positive
and for lawful objects. On one side school-buildings and pupils
were to be provided, and on the other personal service as teacher.
The plaintiff continued ready to perform, but the district refused to
open its houses and allow the attendance of pupils, and it thereby
prevented performance by the plaintiff. Admitting that the circumstances justified the officers, and yet there is no rule of justice
which will- entitle the district to visit its own misfortunes upon the
plaintiff. He was not at fault. He had no agency in bringing
about the state of things which rendered it eminently prudent to
dismiss the schools. It was the misfortune of the district, and the
district, and not the plaintiff, ought to bear it.
The occasion which was presented to the district was not within
the prinbiple contended for. It wzs not one of absolute necessity,
but of strong expediency. To let in the defence that the suspension precluded recovery, the agreement must have provided for it.
But the district did not stipulate for the right to discontinue the
plaintiff's pay on the judgment of its officers, however discreet and
fair, that a stoppage of the schools is found a needful measure to
prevent their invasion by disease, or to stay or oppose its spread or
progress in the community, and the contract cannot be regarded as
tacitly subject to such a condition.
The judgment must be reversed, with costs, and a new trial
granted.
CAMPBELL

and COOLEY, JJ., concurred.

It is laid down by a recent writer on

With reference to the act of God,

contracts, as a general rule, that impps-

rendering performance impossible, Alr.

formation of the contract, whether such
impossibility originates in the default of

Parsons says : "If the performance of a
contract becomes impossible by the act
of God, that is, by a cause which could

the promisor or not, will not excuse
the provisor from performance. If the
promisor makes the performance of his
promise conditional upon its continued
possibility, the promisee takes the risk;
in the event of performance becoming
impossible, the promisee must bear the
loss. But, if the promisor makes his
promise unconditionally, he takes the
risk of being held liable, even though
performance should become impossible
by circumstances beyond his control:
Anson on Contracts 314.

not possibly be attributed to the promisor,
and this impossibility was not among
the probable contingencies which a prudent man should have foreseen. and provided for, it should seem that this would
constitute a sufficient defence." Citing
Villiams v. Lloyd, W. Jones 179, s. c.
nor. Williams v. Ride, Palmer, 543;
Lord v. Wheeler, 1 Gray 282; Oakley
v. Morton, I Kern. 25; farmony v.
"But to make
Binghan, 2 Id. 98.
the act of God a defence, it must amount
to an impossibility of performance by

sibility of performance arising after the
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JAe promisor; mere hardship or difficulty
Citing Bullnck v.
will not suffice."
Dommitt, 6 Tenn. 650; Brecknock Co. v.
Pritchard,6 Id. 750; Atkinson v. Ritchie,
10 East 530; Gilpin v. Consequa, Pet.
C. C. 86; Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn
26; Huling v. Craig, Addison 342;
Harmony v. Bingham, 2 Kern. 99, and
Exposito v. Boteden, 4 Ell. & B. 693,
"So,
reversed in 7 Ell. & B. 763.
the non-performance of the contract is
not excused by an act pf God, where it
still may be substantially carried into
effect, although the act of God makes
a literal and precise performance of it
impossible."
Citing Wh;te v. 31ann, 26
Me. 361 ; Chapnan v. Dalton, Plowden 284; tIolthaia v. Ryland, 1 Eq.
Cas. Abr. 18.
The use of the term "act of God,"
with reference to such cases as that of
Paradine v. Jane, and others cited
above, has been criticized. See Bail,1 v.
De Crespigay, Law Rep. 4 Q. B. 185.
For a definition of the term, see
Nugpnt v. Smnith, Law Rep. 1 C. P. D.
19, 423; Anson on Contracts 256.
The exceptional cases where impossibility of performance (as distinguished
from the express or implied exception of
the act of God, forming a part of every
contract entered into with a carrier)
arising after the making of the contract,
excuses non-f'erformance, have been arranged by Mr. Anson in hii work on
Contracts (p. 315) into three chases.
1. Where a legal impossibility arises
from a change in the law of the country
where the performance is to be made, the
promisor is exonerated.
Thus, where a lessor covenanted that
neither he nor his assigns would erect any
but ornamental buildings on land owned
by him and adjoining certain premises
demised by him; and subhequently, a
railway company, by authority of Parliament, compulsorily took the land and
built a station upon it; and the lessee
then sued the lessor upon the covenant,
it was held, that he was not liable, the

law having made performance impossible: Baily v. De Crespigny, Law Rep.
4 Q. B. 180. See, also, Brewster v.
Kitchell, I Salk. 198.
So, where the corporation of London
raised large sums on bonds conditioned
for the payment of certain yearly sums out
of tolls and duties; and by act of Parliament the power to receive and apply
those tolls and duties was subsequently
taken away from the corporation; in an
action on the bonds it was held, that the
performance of the obligation by the
corporation having been rendered impossible by act of the law, the obligation was discharged and no action thereon wold lie against the corporation :
Brown v. 3fayor 4- C., 13 C. B. N. S.
828.
2. "Where the continued existence
of a specific thing (or person) is essential to the performance of the contract,
its destruction (or the death of the person) from no default of either party,
operates as a discharge."
Thus, where A. agreed with B. to
give him the use of a music hall on certain specified days for the purpose of
holding concerts, with no express stipulation for the event of the destruction of
the music hall by fire, and it was burned,
it was held, that both parties were excused from performance of the contract:
Taylor v. Caldwcell, 3 B. & S. 824.
So, a lessee of coal mines covenanting to work them a certain time, will
be excused from further performance,
if the mines become exhausted before
the expiration of such time: Walker v.
Tucker, 70 I1. 527 ; and A., who promised to return a horse to B. upon B.'s
request, was excused for failing to do so,
the horse having sickened and died before B. asked for its return: Williams v.
Lloyd, W. Jones 179, a. c. nom. Willjains v. Hide, Palmer 543; and see
Kniglt v. Beaa, 22 Me. 536.
In Lord v. Wheeler, I Gray 282, a
workman who had contracted to repair
a house and out-buildings, and who had
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nearly completed the repairs oL the house
when it and the out-buildings were
burned, was held, excused by the
fire, from completing his contract, and
entitled to recover for repairs actually
done.
The plaintiffs contracted to erect
certain machinery on the defendant's
premises at specific prices for particular
portions, and to keep it in repair for two
years. After some portions of the work
had been finished, and others were in
course of completion, the premises and
all the machinery and materials thereon
were destroyed by an accidental fire :
Held, that both parties were excused
from the further performance of the contract: Appleby v. JMyers, Law Rep. 2
C. P. 651. See, also, Scully v. Kirkpatrick, 79 Penn. St. 324.
To an action on a replevin bond it has
been held to be a good defence that the
property was destroyed in the hands of
the plaintiff in replevin by the act of
God before the judgment: Carpenter v.
Stevens, 12 Wend. 589. This decision
has, however, been questioned on the
ground that if one takes property from
its true owner, if it is destroyed in the
taker's hands, he should sustain the loss
and not the owner: Suydarn v. Jenkins,
3 Sandf. 643, per DuEn, J.
A. covenanted with his daughter's
nuoand to give and bequeath her a
share of his estate, but the daughter died
before A., who, upon his decease, left
his property to his widow and smviving
children: Held, that the husband had no
cause of action against A.'s executors,
performance of A.'s covenant having
neen rendered impossible by the daughter's death: Jones v. How, 9 C. B. 1.
"A contract which has for its object
the rendering of personal services, is
discharged by the death or incapacitating
illness of the promisor."
Thus, in Robinson v. Davison, Law
Rep. 6 Ex. 269, defendant contracted
with plaintiff that the former's wife should
play the piano at a concert on a specified

day, on which day, however, she was
unable to play because of illness. The
contract contained no stipulation as to
what was to be done in case the lady
should be too ill to perform. In an
action for this breach of contract it was
held that his wife's illness and consequent
incapacity excused defendant.
So, in Boast v. Frith, Law Rep. 4 C.
P. 1, the permanent illness of an apprentice was held a good defence to an
action on the apprenticeship-deed for a
breach of an unconditional and absolute
covenant therein to serve plaintiff.
In Taylor v. Caldwdl, supra, the court,
J., after reviewing the
per BLAcKiin.u,
authorities, says : "In none of these
cases is the promise in words other than
positive, nor is there any express stipulation that the destruction of the person or
thing shall excuse performance ; but that
excuse is by law implied, because from
the nature of the contract it is apparent
that the parties contracted on the basis of
the continued existence of the particular
person or chattel." See, also, Boast v.
Frith, Law Rep. 4 C. P. 1, and, indeed,
in all the three classes of cases the parties,
when contracting, seem to have contemplated that the person or subject-matter
of the contract would continue to exist
capable of doing or of having done to it
the things stipulated to be performed.
In the principal case' the subjectmatter of defendant's promise was the
furnishing of the school-building, the
pupils to be instructed and the payment
of a compensation for such instruction.
Plaintiff promised substantially to furnish
a teacher (himself), and to instruct.
Teacher, school-house and pupils continued to exist, and beth teacher and
pupils were respectively physically able
to teach and be taught. The teacher was
willing to teach and had le been allowed
to keep open the school, children could
have attended it notwithstanxling tne
prevalence of the disease. There was no
destruction of the subject-matter of the
contract, and, as the pupils were not in-
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capacitated from receiving instruction,
nor the teacher from giving it, there was
no such change in the condition of the
subject-matter as rendered performance
impossible.
The position of the court that mere
hardship or inconvenience attending performance will not excuse a breach, is sustained b:: many authorities. See Booth
v. Spuyten D. R. Al'. Co., 3 Thomp. &
C. (N. Y.) 368; Be~be v. Johnson, 19

Wend. 500; Keizinger v. Sanborn, 70
Ill. 146; Lewis v. Atlas M. L. L Co., 61
Mo. 534; Thorp v. Ross, 4 Abb. App.
Dec. 416; Dernott v. Jones, 2 Wall. I.
The principal case is readily distinguishable from any of those constituting the
three classes above named, and tested by
the rules above laid down, its decision is
undoubtedly correct.
M. D. EWELL.
Chicago, June l1th 1880.
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RECEIVER.

A person having a legal cause of action sounding merely in tort, against a receiver
appointed by the Court of Chancery, has a right to pursue his redress by an action
at law.
Such action cannot be brought without the permission of the chancellor, but such
permission cannot be refused, unless the claim preferred be manifestly unfounded
and vexatious.
The power of the chancellor in this respect considered.
As the right of the chancellor to sanction the bringing of the action, conferred a.
scintilla of jurisdiction over the case, and the parties proceeded to try the cause
before the vice-chancellor: Held, that the Court of Appeals could lawfully exercise
its jurisdiction by way of review, and, the decree being reversed, the complainant's damages were ascertained and adjudged to him on this appeal.

Tils was a suit against the defendant, as the receiver of the
Erie Railway, for damages alleged to have been sustained by the
plaintiff by reason of the negligence of the employees of the
receiver in the management of a train of cars.
The trial took place before the vice-chancellor, who found against
the plaintiff. This decision was appealed from. See 3 Stewart
604.
Ruser and McCreery, for appellant.
C. Parker, for respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BEASLEY, C.

J.-In looking into the propriety of trying a case

of this kind in chancery, I find in the precedents no warrant whatever for such a practice. Such a course is contrary, as it would
VOL. XXVIII.-70
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appear, to fundamental rules. It is not too much to say that
damages of this kind have never been ascertained in an English
court of chancery. I do not find, even in this country, where a
looseness of practice has supervened, incident to the coalescence
of law and equity in the same tribunal, a single instance in which
such a procedure appears.
The general rule undoubtedly is, that damages, as such, will not
be ascertained in equity. Chief Baron GILBERT, in his Forum
.Romanum, thus expresses this inability-his words are: "And it
is a general rule that whenever the matter of the bill is merely
damages, there the remedy is at law, because the damages cannot
be ascertained by the conscience of the chancellor." This is the
language of the decisions, both ancient and modern. It is true
that there are exceptions to this rule, but those exceptions plainly
show its generality and force. Such exceptions rest on the ground
of a convenience very nearly akin to a necessity. The compensation afforded sometimes on bills for specific performance, is one of
such exceptive instances, and yet even in such class the dominance
of the general principle is conspicuous, for there it everywhere
running through the decisions an assertion or implication of the
inadaptation of a court of equity to the admeasurement of
damages in their less tangible forms. The remedy in equity has
been substantially in this line of examples, confined to cases in
which the compensation or damages to be awarded were simply
estimations of the value of lands or other objects of the senses.
In some of the decisions the distinction that exists between
damages of this latter kind and damages to which no fixed standard
is applicable, is sharply defined. Nelson v. Bridges, 2 Beav. 239,
has this aspect, it being the case of a supplemental bill to recover
compensation for stone taken from a quarry, to which, according to
the determination on the original bill, the complainant was entitled;
but Lord LANGDALE decided that the complainant must bring his
suit at law for this injury, on the ground that not only an account
of the stone which had been taken was prayed for, but also an ascertainment of the loss that the complainant had sustained by being
kept out of the use of the quarry. "It appears to me," says the
court, "that the defendants are correct when they say this is a case
of damages and not of account, because it is to recover something
which cannot be ascertained by taking an account of the profits
made; it is to ascertain the amount of the loss which the plaintiff
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has sustained by being prevented doing that which it has been declared he was entitled to do. I think the proper mode of assessing
the amount of damage will be to require the defendants to admit
such facts as are necessary, and to allow the plaintiff to bring an
action quantum damnifieatus." And even in assuming this function, in this contracted sphere, the principle of the Court of Equity
was to call in the aid of a jury whenever the facts were uncertain
or complicated. This is the view of this subject presented by Judge
STORY in the chapter of his Equity Jurisprudence, in which he
treats of the topics of compensation and damages, and in which,
drawing his conclusions from the authorities, he asserts the correct
doctrine to be that damages "should be ascertained by a jury rather
than by the conscience of an equity judge," and "that the just
foundation of equitable jurisdiction fails in all such cases when there
is a plain, complete and adequate remedy at law :" 2 Story Eq.
Jur., § 794.
And it is to be observed that it was not in every case in which
the exercise of such a jurisdiction might have been highly convenient, that a ]power, even to this limited extent, was claimed. In
cases of bills for specific performance, such an authority was oftentimes indispensable, not only to avoid multiplicity of suits, but in
order to enable the court to work out, with completeness, an equitable result. In other cases such a power has recently been conferred
on the English Court of Chancery by express legislation. By the
21 & 22 Vict. c. 27, whenever equity has cognisance by injunction
against any breach of covenant, contract or agreement, or against
the commission or cnntinuance of any wrongful act, or for the
specific performance of any covenant, contract or agreement, the
court can, if it sees fit, award damages to the party injured, either
in addition to, or in substitution for, such injunction or specific performance; and such damages may be assessed in such manner as the
court shall direct. Mr. Daniel, in his treatise on Chancery Practice,
prefaces his statement of the change thus effected with the observation that "formerly the Court of Chancery had, in no case, power
to award damages ;" and nothing can more plainly demonstrate the
original incompetence of the court to discharge the function in question, than this enabling legislation, when viewed in relation to the
class of cases affected by it.
It is also apparent that the current of decisions in thi-' state is
entirely in the direction of the line of practice above described.
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Copper v. Wells, Sax. 10, appears to be the first, in order of time,
of these cases. It was a bill for specific performance, in which the
complainant sought compensation for permanent improvements
which were put upon the land that formed the subject of dispute.
Chancellor VROom, with characteristic niceness of perception, points
to the distinction between the two classes of damages already connoted. His words are: "But there is a wide distinction between
mere damages arising from the non-performance of a contract, which
damages may be partly imaginary and partly the result of actual or
supposed inconvenience or loss, and the compensation to which a
party is justly entitled for repairs, or beneficial or lasting improvements made to property, under the faith of an engagement, which
is afterwards discovered to be defective in itself, or impossible to be
executed by the default of the opposite party. In the one case, the
damages can be properly assessed only by a jury, upon an issue of
quantum damnificatus; in the other, the compensation may be safely
ascertained by an inquiry before a master or commissioners, or, at
the discretion of the court, an issue may be awarded." This, it is
evident, was putting the matter on a strictly legal footing, as it
asserted the jurisdiction, and nothing more than the jurisdiction,
which had been exercised by the English chancellors prior to the
enactments to which attention has just been called, and at the same
time it rejected that extension of authority which has been effected
by force of such enactments.
And this same doctrine is carried through the subsequent train
of decisions. Among these is the judgment in Berry v. Fan 11inide's Ex'rs, 1 Gr. Oh. 269. This was a bill by a lessee for specific
performance, and it claimed compensation for permanent improvements and damages occasioned to the complainant from having been
cut off, by the act of the defendant, "from his usual supply of water,"
and by having been deprived of certain other facilities to which he
was entitled under his contract. But this latter branch of the complainant's claim was declared by the court to be beyond its jurisdiction, the chancellor, with respect to the general rule, saying: " In
all cases resting in damages only, it is certainly more in accordance
with our system of jurisprudence that they should be ascertained at
law, where the jury can pass upon them, and the witnesses are seen
and examined in open court."
Of the same legal import is the case of Hopper v. Lutkins, 3 Gr.
0h. 149. This was an injunction bill to restrain a suit at law on a
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note given for the purchase-money of a tract of land which the defendant had conveyed to the complainant, on the understanding that
a certain dam, then erected, stood at its proper height, and that the
complain ant had suffered great damage by not being able, as against
a superior legal right, so to maintain it. The court denied its competency to entertain such a question with respect to damages, remarking that such a matter differed fundamentally from the inquiry
which arises when a vendee fails to obtain all the land intended to
be conveyed, and in which instance, in a proper case, an allowance
by way of compensation for such loss will be made, as the amount
of such compensation may readily be made in equitable modes.
This, again, is but an application of the English rule as it originally
existed. See Iszad v. Mays Landing Co., 4 Stew. 511.
It will, therefore, be observed from this brief review of some of
the more important of the authorities, that even when a contract
had been broken, it was the general principle of equity, as it
existed originally in England, and at all times in this state, that
where damages were of an intangible character, they could not be
admeasured under the authority of the chancellor. Nor am I
aware that, with respect to torts to the person, it was ever so much
as suggested, within such jurisdictions, that the compensation to
be awarded in consequence of such malfeasances could, by force
of any conjuncture of circumstances, be ascertained in a court
of equity.
Such, then, being the usual principle, the question remains,
whether it becomes modified, or, rather, altogether abolished, when
a receiver appointed by the court is the wrongdoer. The actionable injury in the present case arose from the neglect of one of the
employees of such receiver, and the inquiry, therefore, is, whether
that quality of the transaction draws to the court of equity cognisance of the litigation. It is claimed that, under such a form of
proceeding, although the action is for a tort to the property and
person, the chancellor, can, in his discretion, try the law and the
facts and assess the danages. We have seen already that, if such
a jurisdiction exists in equity, it is, to a very remarkable degree,
inconsistent with the ordinary principles on which a court of this
class proceeds, and that in this department it attempts to do what
in all other departments it is said to be illy adapted to do. In
view of the striking inconsistency, if such a practice exists in this
particular class of cases, we would expect to find strong reasons for
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such a diversity, as well as repeated precedents testifying to its
prevalence; but, upon examination, I find neither such reasons
nor such precedents.
It does not seem to me that there is anything in the nature of
the affair that has even a tendency to legitimate such a course.
The claim in such a case is purely a legal one, and without a
single feature distinguishing it from the ordinary matters which
are tried at common law. The plaintiff must recover, if he
recovers at all, by force of legal, and not of equitable, rules. The
damages are not susceptible of any exact estimation, their only
measure being an experienced judgment. It is universally admitted that, according to the theory in which our jurisprudence is
founded, such questions are not adapted to the judicial methods
of a court of equity: such questions are universally, with this
exception, if such exception exists, confided to the courts of com
mon law. Such damages as these have always been assessed by a
jury.
Why, then, should there be a deviation, in these particular
instances, from this clearly-marked track? I am unable to perceive that it is founded in any circumstance of convenience, much
less in any necessity. The settlement of these claims in the
common mode, by a suit at common law, in nowise jars with the
due execution of his office by the receiver. Such a suit does not
disturb, or even affect, the receiver's possession of the property
intrusted to him by the court, for, if a judgment ensue, it cannot,
without an application to the chancellor, be enforced by levy on
such property. And, for the same reason, it does not interfere
with the absolute control vested in the court of equity over the
property sequestered. It tends to embarrass, therefore, neither
the court nor the officer of the court; all that it does is to settle
the legal right and the amount of the damages in that method,
which, in the adjustments of our legal system, is deemed the easier
and the better. Nor can it be overlooked that a strong argument
ab inconvenienti can be urged in behalf of the party seeking redress
against this claim of equitable cognisance. It certainly imposes
great burthens upon such a litigant. In the present instance the
hearing was before the vice-chancellor, and the testimony was,
therefore, taken viva voce ; but such a circumstance, if this species
of jurisdiction be admitted, is not a necessary incident to the proceeding: the entire testimony may be taken in writing in the
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mode customary in the practice in chancery: and to try a question
of tort in such a manner, would be, it is conceived, both expensive
and unsatisfactory. It is certainly not too much to say that, if an
action for negligence, resulting in injury to the person, can be
tried in equity as well as it can at law, there is not the least
propriety in maintaining two systems in their distinct forms. In
addition to these defects, the party injured, in order to reap the
benefit of his litigation, would be obliged to sustain his case twice
upon the merits, once in the court below and once in this court.
If it had appeared that a trial in equity of a matter of this kind
had possessed the merit of convenience, it would not have gone far
in establishing a title to such jurisdiction; but even this imperfect
support seems to be wanting.
With regard to precedents indicating the possession of such a
jurisdiction by courts of equity, I have not found one wearing
such a semblance. The course of the English chancery on this
subject appears not to have been settled until a comparatively
recent period, but is now quite clearly defined. At no stage of
such practice are there any indications, even in the faintest degree,
that the prerogative was claimed to take cognisance of all the
litigations in which the receiver was a party. The power exercised
was this: to prevent the property put in trust in the hands of the
receiver from being taken from him without the assent of the
court, and to protect that officer from molestation by baseless
litigation. But the method by which these ends were accomplished
was not by an assumption of jurisdiction over all actions, whether
legal or equitable, brought against the receiver, but by the expedient of requiring, as a pre-requisite to such suits, the assent of the
chancellor. When such an application was made, unless it plainly
appeared that the alleged right of a'ction had no foundation, and
that the proceedings would be merely vexatious, the assent of the
court to the bringing of the action was given, not as a matter of
grace, but ex debito justitia. Neither in any case, nor in any
judicial expression, have I found any indication of a claim on the
part of the chancellor of a right to try questions of tort, and, with
respect to all doubtful legal questions, it has ever been the right of
the party litigating with the receiver to have his case tried at law.
Even that measure of control that prevented a suit being proseouted against its receiver, without the permission of the court,
cannot, perhaps, be said to have been fully established at the time
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the English decisions ceased to be imperative authority in the
courts of this state. Angel v. Smith, which came before Lord
ELDON in the year 1804, and is reported in 9 Yes. Jr. 335, is the
leading case upon the subject. Before that time the practice was
settled for encumbrancers on the property sequestered to come into
equity and be examined _ro interesse suo, and the court, as is now
done on a foreclosure bill, proceeded to settle. the rights and
priorities. (See Bowles v. Parsons, 1 Dick. 142; Hamlyn v
Lee, Id. 94 ; Hunt v. Priest,2 Id. 540.) But in the first case
just referred to, the question was distinctly presented, whether an
ejectment would lie against the receiver without the chancellor
having first sanctioned the proceeding. The action had been
brought without asking permission. The point was treated by
both, court and counsel as an open one, it being urged in argument,
that it had "never been decided that, where a receiver had been
appointed, a person claiming under a legal title, not derived in the
cause, may not bring an ejectment." Lord ELDON appeared to be
in doubt with respect to the rule of practice, and he appealed to
the register of the court for information., The register "apprehends" that such motions for leave to bring suit have been made,
and then the chancellor says: "There may be inconvenience in
that, but the inconvenience the other way is enormous. If it is
necessary to ask leave, the court must have credit for never
refusing it when it ought to be granted; and if so, very great
purposes of convenience may be answered by putting the party to
ask it." He adds: "The court certainly would not require a man
to disclose all his evidence in the master's office. That would be a
very oppressive mode."
Then the opinion concludes by this
formulation of the doctrine: "If the court will permit its decree
to be disturbed by persons having or pretending, title, nothing
could be more easy than to prevent the execution of the decree.
It will permit it, whenever there is a legal right to disturb it.
The only question is, whether the court, having taken possession,
should not be informed whether it is a proper case; and I desire it
to be considered as my opinion that an ejectment cannot be
brought, without leave of the court, where there is a receiver."
I have thus emphasized this case because, as I have said, it is
the case always referred to on this subject, and because it clearly
marks out the line of practice. The limits of the practical rule are
here very plainly settled. It establishes that permission to sue
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must be asked, and that the court will look into the title, and if
the claim be obviously frivolous, permission to sue will be denied.
So, if the title were incontestably clear against the receiver, the
court certainly would have the power to relinquish the property to
the claimant. And this is the entire control that Lord ELDON
claimed, for, so far was he fiom asserting any right to try the case
as against the plaintiff, that he expressly declares "the court would
not require a man to disclose all his evidence in the master's office.
That would be a very oppressive mode."
This is the rule that is, in substance, conformed to in the subsequent decisions, and the views thus expressed by Lord ELDON
have never, so far as is observed, been brought in question: Brooks
v. Greathed, 1 J. & W. 175; Dunne v. Farrel,1 Ball & B. 123;
Gresley v. Adderle/, 1 Swans. 578; Ame8 v. Trustees of Birkenhead Docks, 20 Beav. 332.
From this practice Vice-Chancellor KINDERSLEY appears to have
deviated in the case of Banfield v. Banfield, 1 Drew. & Sm. 314.
The facts were these: A receiver was in possession, and the lord
of the manor asked leave to enter upon the property and take the
rents and profits, and the vice-chancellor considered that it was
plain that he had no right, and so decided against his title. But
this step was disapproved of on appeal, Lord Justice TURNER thus
commenting upon it: "That decision appears to me to be exceedingly strong, for there can be no doubt that if the court was not
in possession of the estate by its receiver, the lord would be
entitled to seize, in order to try the question whether the devisee
was bound to take admittance or not; and it is not, as I apprehend,
according to the course of the court, to refuse liberty to try a right
which is claimed against its receiver, unless it is perfectly clear
that there is no foundation for the claim. The vice-chancellor's
decision went, therefore, the full length of saying that the lord had
no possible claim; and his honor, indeed, has so put the case in
giving judgment. I am certainly not prepared to go that length,
and unless, therefore, all the parties interested had been desirous
that we should decide the question of right, and had been content
to abide by our opinion upon it, subject, of course, to an appeal to
the House of Lords, I think that leave must have been given to
seize, in order that the question of right might be tried."
These observations constitute a pointed reaffirmation of the proper
rule of practice as promulgated by Lord ELDON, establishing plainly,
VOL. XXVfI.-71
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as they do, that in this class of cases the chancellor will not undertake
to decide a purely legal question against the person who demands
from him a trial at law. And it seems superfluous to say that if it
be abnormal for equity to pass upon so simple and uncircumstantial
a question as a claim to realty, because such a subject belongs to
common law cognisance, the supposition that such a tribunal can
entertain an action for tort to the person becomes unreasonble in
the extreme. If a proposition to take charge of such a suit has
ever been made to the English chancery, it has escaped my attention. Nor have I found that such a course has been taken by the
courts of any of the states of this Union. My conclusion is, that
the jurisdiction exercised in this case has no footing in judicial
recognition or in any principle of practice.
Nor is the doctrine thus repudiated sustained by considerations
of justice or public policy. We have seen that the doctrine is not
necessary, either to the court or to its officers, for the proper discharge of their functions. Its prevalence would impose an unnecessary and severe burthen on the party seeking redress. It would
give the receiver an incongruous and unfair advantage, for while he
undoubtedly would have his action at law for all torts affecting him
officially, the advantage of that mode of trial would be denied to his
opponent. The existence of the power would seem to be as undesirable as its title is in point of law unfounded.
Nor would its existence in the practice of our own courts harmonize with the arrangements of our legal system. The constitution, in its provisions establishing the inviolability of the trial by
jury, must be regarded as admonitory to the courts to guard against
every attempt to encroach on the legitimate sphere of that favored
mode of redressing injuries. And the very statute which provides
for the winding up of insolvent corporations through the apparatus
of a receivership, is careful to preserve this right, for, with respect
to mere money claims presented to the receiver, it ordains that
either that officer or the creditor may require the controversy to be
submitted for decision to a jury under the direction of a justice of
the Supreme Court. To preserve this right in such instances of
accounts, and at the same time to abandon to equity the unaccustomed field of strictly legal rights, and such remedies as trespass
and ejectment, would be an adjustment of procedures that would
seem quite preposterous. In point of fact, this statutory provision
restricts the operation of the rule of equitable practice as propounded
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by Lord ELD ON, for, under that rule, these matters of account would
be definitively ascertainable in chancery; but in all other respects
that rule remains unmodified, and exists as one of the modes of
equitable procedure.
The result of this review of the subject is, that in my judgment
the plaintiff in this case was entitled, as a matter of right, to a jury
trial. But the order refusing him such right has not been appealed
fiom, as it unquestionably might have been ; and -as both parties
submitted to a trial before the vice-chancellor, I have concluded,
though not without some misgiving, that the decision rendered in
the court below is susceptible of being reviewed on the mtrits on
this appeal. An analogous course appears to have been taken in
the before-cited case of Ranfield v. Ranfield.
Coming, then, to the merits of the case involved in the issues of
fact, this court has concluded that this decree must, with respect to
them, be reversed.
[The review of the special facts of the case is omitted, as not of
general interest.]
Decree reversed.
The court of chancery seems formerly
to have had jurisdiction in cases of assaulte, and trespasses, which were cognisable at common law, but for which the
party complaining was unable to obtain
redress in consequence of the protection
affbrded the offender by some powerful
baron, sheriff or other officer of the
county, where the offence occurred: I
Story's Eq. Jur.,
48.
The rule that where there is no adequate legal remedy, the court of chancery supplies the defect, only applies to
common-law, and not to statutory rights:
Janney v. Baitl, 55 Ala. 408; Ryves
v. IVellington, 9 Beav. 579 ; Attorney.
General v. Sherffidd Co., 3 DeG., M. &
G. 320; lVinthrop v. Lane, 3 Dessauss.
325, note; Eborn v. IValdo, 6 Jones Eq.
111 ; Fletcher T. Hooper, 32 Md. 210 ;
Niagara Bridge Co. v. Great Western
Railroad Co., 39 Barb. 212.
Past torts cannot be redressed in
equity: Moyd. v. THarper, 3 Edw. 109;
Owr-n v. Ford, 49 Me. 436 ; Cobb v.
Smith, 16 Wis. 661.

A mere tort as to personal property
gives no jurisdiction (Davidson v. Floyd,
15 Fla. 667; Long v. Barker, 85 Ill.
431 ; Du Pre v. Villiams, 5 Jones Eq.
96; Taylor v. Turner, 87 IIl. 296;
Quinney v. Stockbridqe, 33 Wis. 502) :
unless joined with some equitable ground
of intervention, as account : Pierce v.
Bruce, 38 Ga. 444.
Mere negligence on the part of agents
or others acting in a fiduciary capacity

confers no jurisdiction (Taylor v. Ferguson, 4 Har. & Johns. 46; TVose v.
Philbrook, 3 Story 335; Furlow v. Till"nan, 21 Ga. 150; Russ v. WV7hon, 22
Me. 207 ; Odell v. Mundy, 59 Ga. 641) ;
aliter,if fraud be mixed with such negligence ( Seabrook v. Underwriters, 43 Ga.
583) ; and, it seems, the chancellor may
remove a coroner from office for neglect
of duty (Parnell's Case, I J. & W. 45 ;
Pasley's Case, 3 Dr. & War. 34) ; but
will not restrain a party from dismissing
an employee (Thomas v. Supervisors, 56
Ill. 351. See Hugg v. Camden, 2 Stew.
6 ; Butchery. Camden, Id. 478 ; Sheridex
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v. Colm, 78 Il1. 237 ; Yongs v. Ransom, 31 Barb. 49) ; chancery will prevent an indictment, arrest or other
interference with its officers for any
irregularity, &c., in carrying out its
decrees (Batchelor v. Blake, I Hog. 98 ;
.Hyde v. Holmes, 3 Moll. 373 ; Turner
v. Turner, 15 Jur. 218 ; Pdhamv. Newcastle, 3 Swanst. 289; WValker v. Mickleahwait, I Dr. & Sm. 49 ; York v. Pilkington, 2 Atk. 302; Aston v. Heron, 2
Myl. & K. 390; Chalie v. Pickering, 1
Keen 749 ; Mackay v. Blackett, 9 Paige
437 ; Winfield v. Bacon, 24 Barb. 154;
Foot v. Sprague, 12 How. Pr. 355 ;
Peck v. Crane, 25 Vt. 146; Mills 'i.
Kispert, 21 Wis. 387) ; and enjoin the
preaching of a sermon on the subject of
a pending suit (Mackett v. Conns, 24
W. R. 845) ; but it will not interfere.
with one in arrest under the criminal
process of another court (Stuart v. La
Salle Co. 83 Ill. 341. See Hall v. Commissioners, 31 How. Pr. 237, note);
or his bail (Allen v. Hamilton, 9 Gratt.
255) ; nor issue a ne exeat simply because
another court cannot arrest the defendant: Shubert v. Bull, 4 Ch. Sent., N. Y.,

complainants in their usual business trans.
actions, and prayed a discovery. Held,
they must discover : Gartsidev. Outran
3 Jur. (N. S.) 39. See Derriny v.
Chapman, 11 How. Pr. 382.
A debtor cannot be restrained from
applying for his discharge as an insolvent,
on the ground that he has removed his
property to another state in order to avoid
paying his creditors (6Croom v. Davis, 6
Ala. 40; see Fillingin v. Thornton, 49
Ga. 384); but it seems, on proper
grounds, a plaintiff at law may be enjoined from taking the defendant's body
in execution: Frost v. Myrick, I Barb.
362. See Hays v. Ford, 55 Ind. 52 :
Paine v. Puttenham, Dyer 306 a.
The removal of a corpse from a common burial-ground, against the relative's
consent, may be restrained: Girard's
Case, 5 Penn. Law Jour. Rep. 68. See
Wynkoop v. Wynkoop, 42 Penn. St. 293;
6 Am. Law Rev. 182.
That chancery will enjoin repeated illegal arrests that interfere with the enjoyment of corporate franchises, see Christie
v. Bergh, 15 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 51 ; also
Davis v. Society, 16 Id. 73; but not the
warnings of persons by the police as to
33.
A negro may not obtain his freedom, the character, &c., of houses which they
if entitled thereto, in chancery (Peters v. are passing: Prendordll v. Knnedy, 34
Van Lear, 4 Gill 249; Townslend v. How. Pr. 416; Gillert v. Mkckle, 4
Townshend, 5 Ald. 287 ; Rumph v. Mar- Sandf. Ch. 357; Sterman v. Kennedy, 15
ing, 8 Rich. Eq. 136. See Phebe v. Abh. Pr. 201 ; Chicago v. W|fright. 69
Quillin, 21 Ark. 490) ; nor can officers I11. 318.
Threats of personal violence to the
be enjoined from arresting a man drafted
into the army, although the use of the agents and employees of a company, if
writ of habeas corpus was then suspended they persist in entering defendant's lands
(Kneedler v. Lane, 3 Grant's Cas. 523) and building their railroad there, as they
have a right to do by their charter, does
by a divided court, however.
The hishop's removal of a clergyman, not give equity jurisdiction (.iontgomtry
- 11. Ruilroad Co. v. Wllton, 14 Ala.
in pursuance of an ecclesiastical decree,
can only be enjoined if his civil rights 207) ; so, of threats by a purchaser of
have thereby been taken away unjustly: fixtures to enter the house and relnove
II atker v. Wainwvright, 16 Barb. 486. them, a breach of the peace being imnminent (Hamilton v. Stewart, 59 Ill. 330) ;
See Youngs v. Ransom, 31 Barb. 49.
To a bill to restrain defendant from so, of threats by an insolvent person to
making disclosures affecting complain- have complainant arrested (Burch v.
Cavanaugh, 12 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 410) .
ants' reputation, on the ground that his
so, of threats to bring an action for an
information was obtained confidentially,
alleged infringement of a trade-mark
he answered, setting up the frauds of

PALYS v. JEWETT.
(Wolfe v. Burkc, 56 N. Y. 115); so, of
threats to bring other actions, while one
was pending, to recover a penalty for not
working a highway (Hartman v. Heady,
57 Ind. 545) ; so, of forcible entry and
detainer (Lamb v.Drew, 20 Iowa 15;
Curd v. Farrar,47 Id. 504; Hamilton
v. Adams, 15 Ala. 596; McGuire v.
Stewart, 1 Mon. 189; &uudrrs v. Webber, 39 Cal. 287; Comstock v. Henneberry, 66 Ill.
212; Rapp v. Williams, I
Hun. 716; Winterfield v. Stauss, 24
Wis. 394). Aliter, where an equitable
ground for interference exists (C,auford
v. Paine, 19 Iowa 172; Hillebrant Y.
Barton, 39 Tex. 599; McIntyre v. Hernandez, 7 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 214).
That defendant seduced complainant's
infant daughter, and, to avoid redress at
law, fraudulently disposed of his property and then absconded, gives no jurisdiction (Meres v. CViisman, 7 Bl. Mon.
422) ; nor, that the defendant, in order
to escape his statutory liability, as her
putative father, to support complainant,
had removed from the state, leaving property (Simmons v. Bull, 21 Ala. 501 ;
see Furrillisv. Cro,rtwr, 7 D. & It. 612;
AlMoncrief v. Ely, 19 Wend. 403) ; nor,

that defendant maltreated hisapprentice,
the complainant (Argls v. Heaseman, I
Atk. 518).
Penalties for violating statutes cannot
be enforced in equity (Kerr v. Preton,
Law Rep. 6 Chanc. Div. 463; namersleg v. Germantown Co., 8 Phila. R. 314;
Hudon v. Thorne, 7 Paige 261 ; Schwab
v. Md ion, 49 Ind. 329 ; West v. New
Yrk. 10 Paige 539 ; lVallackv. Society,
67 N. Y. 23; Cohen v. Goldsboro, 77 N.
C. 2 ; Lamport v. Abbott, 12 How. Pr.
340; Gordon v. Lowell, 21 Me. 251;
Moses v. Mobile, 52 Ala. 198; Burnat
v. Craig, 30 Id. 133) ; nor a mandamus
be enjnined (Montague v. Dudman, 2
Ves., Sr., 396; N uie River Co. v. lNew
Berne, 6 Jone- 204; Columbia Co. v.
Bryson, 13 Fla. 281) ; nor a certiorari
issued (Berry v. Hardin, 28 Ark. 458) ;
nor a quo warranto(sceAttorney-General
v. Bank, 1 Ilopk. Ch. 354; Lewis v.

Oliver, 4 Abb. Pr. 121; Campbell v.
Taggart, 10 Phila. R. 443; Taek
v. Brumley, I Barb. Ch. 519); nor a
prohibition: Bean v. Pattengill, 2 Abb.
Pr. (N. S.) 58.
Although chancery has no jurisdiction
to enjoin the prosecution of a crime (2
Story's Eq. Jur., 893; Holderstaffe v.
Saunders, 6 Mod. 16; Emperorof Austria
v. Day, 3 DeG., F. & J. 253; C.x v.
Paxton, 17 Ves. 329; Sparhawk v. Union
Pass. Railroad Co., 54 Penn. St. 401 ;
Joseph v. Burk, 46 Ind. 59 ; Gault v.
Wallis, 53 Ga. 675 ; Fetcher v. Hooper,
32 Md. 210; Campbell v. Scholfield, 2
Pitts. 443; Van Rensselaer v. Griswold,
3 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 94) ; yet the drawing of a legalized lottery may be restrained, if irregular (&ate v. Maury, 2
Del. Ch. 141 ; State v. Eddy, Id. 269) ;
or the distribution of the prizes drawn,
on which proceedings to declare them
forfeited have been begun (People v.
Kent, 6 Cal. 89); or proceedings on a
judgment obtained against complainant
on a bond to which his name had been
forged (Reynolds v. Dothard, 7 Ala.
664: Jameson v. Deshilds, 2 Gratt. 4) ;
or a conspiracy to defraud complainant
(Daiwin v. Smith, 25 Me. 379) ; or a
nuisance on which the trial of an indictment is pending (Raleigh v. Hunter, 1
Dev. Eq. 12; and see Attorney-Generas
V. Cleaver, 18 Ves. 220; Gilbert v.
Mickle, 4 Sandf. Ch. 357) ; or where a
subsequent indictment is not for exactly
the same injury (Saull v. Browne, L.
Rep. 10 Ch. App. 64); or where an
embezzler was dead, and his widow
having placed his money in the bank
from which he embezzled, began proceedings, as administratrix, to recover it,
and to an injunction by the bank restraining her, she demurred, on the
ground that the bill alleged a felony
( lVickham v. Gatrill,2 Sm. & Giff. 353.
See Crowne v. Baylis, 31 Beav. 351.)
So an ecclesiastical court may entertain a suit to suspend a clergyman, on a
charge that constitutes a criminal oflence:
Burder v. , 3 Curt. 822.
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Generally, if an indictment or public
remedy is adequate, equity will not
interfere (Attorney- Generalv. Heishon, 3
C. E. Gr. 410, and cases cited; People
Y. Horton, 5 Hun 516) ; but the attorneygeneral may, semble, sue in eq.uity, even
for a legal demand (Attorney-General v.
Galway, 1 Moll. 95; Attorney-General
v. Railroad Co., 35 Wis. 425. See
t torney-Generalv. Tudor Ice Co., 104
Mass. 239.)
In the following cases it has been held
that a receiver of an insolvent railroad
is not an agent or servant of the company, and hence that the company is
not liable for damages occasioned by his
negligence while operating the road :
Metz v. Buffalo Railroad Co., 58 N. Y.
61 ; Ohio Railroad Co. v. Davis, 23 Ind.
553; Hopkins v. Connel, 2 Tenn. Ch.
323; Bell v. IndianapolisRailroad Co.,
53 Ind. 57; Erwin v. Davenport, 9 Heisk.
44; State v. Consolidated Railroad Co.,
67 Me. 479. Contra, Lamphear v.Buck-

ingham, 33 Conn. 237 ; Klein v. Jewett
11 C. E. Green 474, 12 C. E. Gr.
550; Meara v. Holbrook, 20 Ohio St.
137. See Kinney v. Croccer, 18 Wis.
74 ; Davenport v. Alabama Railroad, 2
Woods 519; Safford v. People, 85 Ill.
558; Allen v. Central Railroad Co., 42
Iowa 683; Daniels v. Hart, 118 Mass.
543. Nor is the receiver personally
liable (Cardot v. Barney, 63 N. Y. 281 ;
Camp v. Barney, 4 Hun 373; Kain v.
Smith, 11 Id. 552 ; Hendersonv. 11alker,
55 Ga. 481) ; although such company is
liable for loss as a carrier (Blumenthal v
Brainerd, 38 Vt. 402; AMorse v. Brainerd, 41 Id. 550; Paige v. Smith, 99 Mass.
395; Newell v. Smith, 49 Vt. 255:
Cowdrey v. Galveston Railroad, 93 U. S.
352; Nichols v. Smith, 115 Mass. 2M2;
Barter v. Wheeler, 49 N. H. 9; Pearson v. IVheder, 55 Id. 41.)
J. H. STEWART.
Trenton, N. J.

United States District Court; Southern District of Ohio.
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CINCINNATI v. H. M. BATES.
A warehouse receipt, though not in the commercial sense of the term negotiable,
is an assignable instrument.
The assignment and delivery of such an instrument vests the legal title of the
property in the assignee, without notice to the warehouseman.
The statement in such an instrument, that the property is to be delivered upon
order, upon the return of the receipt is a representation upon which the assignee has
a right to rely, and if after the assignment and delivery of such an instrument, the
warehouseman, without the consent of the assignee, delivered the property to the
person to whom he had given the receipt, he will be liable to the assignee for the
value thereof, although lie had no notice of such assignment.

Tis was an action brought by the assignee of warehouse receipts
against the warehouseman, for delivering the property stored to the
assignor, after the assignment. The facts were substantially as
follows: IT. December 1876 and January 1877, defendant received
from James B. Grant, three lots of lard, and issued therefor ware-
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nouse receipts, each receipt stating that the lard was "subject to
his order upon the return of this warehouse receipt."
Grant afterwards assigned and delivered these receipts to plaintiff, who, however, did not notify defendant of the assignment.
Defendant afterwards, without any knowledge of such assignment,
del, 'ered the lard to Grant without requiring the production of the
receipts. Plaintiff claimed that the receipts had been assigned to
it as collateral for all indebtedness, present or future, on account
of loans made from time to time to Grant, and that this indebtedness at the time of suit brought, amounted to more than the value
of the lard. Defendant claimed that the receipts had been assigned
as collateral for special loans which had been afterwards repaid, and
further, that as defendant had received no notice of the assignment,
he was discharged from all liability by his delivery of the lard to
Grant.
Lincoln, Stephens J.Slattery, for plaintiff.
I. A. Jordan and Jordan,Jordan

Williams, for defendant.

SWING, J., charged the jury as follows:

Upon a demurrer to the evidence, we have already determined
that this action is in the nature of an action of trover to recover
for a wrongful conversion of the property described in the warehouse receipts. It is therefore unnecessary to determine the negotiable properties of warehouse receipts. We may remark, however,
that in the commercial sense of the term they are not negotiable
instruments. But it is the well-settled law that they are assignable.
In this view we are required to ascertain, therefore, what rights
of property and possession vested in the assignee by the assignment
of these warehouse receipts, but in doing this we shall not attempt
a review of the numerous authorities cited by learned counsel, or
perhaps the more difficult task, of reconciling them, as the Supreme
Court of the United States, in Gbson v. Stevens, 3 How. 399, has
declared the law upon the subject, and by this we are governed.
In that case McQueen & McKay had purchased of certain parties,
a quantity of pork and flour, which was then in the warehouse of
the vendors, and had taken from them a written memorandum of
the sale, with a receipt for the money, and an engagement to deliver
it in canal boats soon after the opening of canal navigation.
There was also a written guarantee that the articles should bear
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inspection. Afterwards, McQueen & McKay, in consideration of
advancements made to them by a commission merchant, endorsed
and delivered these papers to the merchant, and the question determined by the court was the legal effect of such indorsement and
delivery.
Chief Justice TANEY, in delivering the opinion of the court, says:
"In the opinion of the court, it transferred to him the legal title and
constructive possession of the property; and the warehouseman,
from the time of this transfer, became his bailee, and held the pork
and flour for him; the delivery of the evidence of title and the
orders indorsed upon them was equivalent to the delivery of the
property itself."
The principle of that case applies to the assignment and delivery
of warehouse receipts, and was so recognised by Judge DILLON -in
Harris v. Bradley, 2 Dill. 285, and by Justice MILLER of the
Supreme Court, in McNeil v. Hill, 1 Woolworth 96.
The legal title and constructive possession of the property being
vested in the assignee of the warehouse receipts, he has the right
to maintain an action for its conversion.
If, therefore, the jury shall find from the evidence in the case,
that the warehouse receipts in controversy were assigned and delivered by Grant to the plaintiff in pledge as collateral security for
any general indebtedness which then, or might thereafter exist from
Grant to the plaintiff, and said Grant was then indebted, or afterward
became indebted upon the fa.th and credit of these papers to the
plaintiff, and such indebtedness remains unpaid, and the defendant,
without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff, surrendered the
lard to Grant, the plaintiff will be entitled to your verdict for the
value of the property, not exceeding the amount of the indebtedness by Grant to the bank, and to this the jury may add a sum
equal to six per cent. interest to the first day of the term.
The defendant, having delivered to Grant these receipts, placed
it in his power to treat with the plaintiff upon the faith of them;
and his statement in them that the lard was to be delivered upon
the order of Grant upon the return of the receipts, was a representation upon which the plaintiff had a right to rely; and if, without the return of such receipts, he delivered this lard to Mr. Grant
it will not protect him in this case.
If the jury find from the evidence in the case, that all of the
warehouse receipts in controversy, were not pledged as general col-
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laterals for general indebtedness of Grant to the plaintiff, but were
pledged as special collaterals to secure specific loans, and the loans
for which they were pledged have all been paid, then your veilict
will be in favor of the defendant; or if a portion of them were so
specifically pledged, the plaintiff would not he entitled to a recovery
for those so pledged.
The plaintiff has asked the court to give the jury the following
instructions, among others:
1. We ask the court to instruct the jury, that if the defendant
received the 300 tierces of lard from James B. Grant into his warehouse, and gave him the three warehouse receipts set out in the
petition, and while the said lard was so stored in the said warehouse,
the said Grant endorsed the said warehouse receipts, delivered and
pledged them to plaintiffs under the paper in evidence called a
general collateral, dated December 23d 1876, for money then
borrowed or then due, and as a basis of continued debt or of
continued or future loans, and the plaintiff in good faith, relying
upon such pledge, subsequently loaned, or continued the loans upon
the faith of such warehouse receipts as a security, and which
loans are now due and owing the bank, then the lard named in such
receipts, from the time of such pledge and endorsement, became the
property of the plaintiff to the extent of such indebtedness, and if
the defendant afterwards gave said lard to Grant, or to any one
else, without the return of the said warehouse receipts, and without the consent or knowledge of the plaintiff, whereby it has been
lost to the plaintiff, then the defendant is liable in this action to the
plaintiff for the value of said lard at the time of its delivery to
said Grant and loss to the plaintiff, and the jury may add to such
sum as damages, a sum equal to six per cent. thereon. Given.
2. If the plaintiff and defendants have both suffered by the fraud
of James B. Grant, by the defendants leaving the warehouse
receipts in question outstanding, and the delivery to him of the
lard without the said warehouse receipts, and by the use of said
receipts by said Grant in the ordinary course of business as a means
of credit with the plaintiff, then the defendant must bear the loss.
Given.
3. That to transfer the title to property held by a warehouseman, and for which he has given a regular warehouse receipt, to a
party as collateral security for a loan, by endorsement and delivery
of the warehouse receipt. it is not necessary that the party receiving
VOL. X=VIII.-72
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the receipt as such collateral shall give notice of the assignment of
such receipt to him. Given.
The defendant has also asked special instructions, as follows:
1. The warehouse receipts of Bates, copied into the petition,
were not negotiable, so that their endorsement and delivery by
Grant to the bank vested a right of action thereon in the bank
against Bates for the lard or the value thereof.
Refused, as written, given as follows: "It did not vest a right
of action as upon a negotiable note or bill of exchange, but it did
vest in the bank a right to maintain an action for injury to, or conversion of, or for a recovery of the property."
2. The endorsement and delivery of said warehouse receipts by
Grant to the bank created no privity of contract between them
which prevented Bates from delivering said lard to Grant unless
said Bates had notice of said transfer to the bank. Refused.
3. The only effect of said endorsement and delivery of the warehouse receipts by Grant to the bank was to transfer to said bank
the title to said lard and the right to its possession, and to constitute said Bates the bailee of said bank when notified of said
transfer to the bank. Refused.
4. The stipulation of said warehouse receipts that said lard is
subject to the order of Grant on the return of said receipts, is personal between said Bates and Grant, and said Bates could waive
their return unless he had notice of their transfer to the bank.
Refused.
5. If said First National Bank and the warehouse and place of
business of said Bates were in Cincinnati. and the same was known
to the representative officers of said bank, and they did not, within
a reasonable time after said receipts were transferred to the bank,
notify said Bates of said transfer, then said bank was guilty of
negligence, and said Bates was not bound to keep said lard, but was
justified in delivering it to said Grant. Refused.
6. If the representative officers of said bank knew, while the
bank held said receipts, that said Grant was, from time to time,
obtaining said lard in parcels from said Bates, and did not object,
then said bank cannot complain if said Bates delivered all said lard
to said Grant. Refused.
7. If said bank officers bad good reason to believe, from the
course of business of said Grant with said Bates, that said Grant
was obtaining said lard in parcels from time to time, while it held
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said receipts, it was their duty to have inquired about it, and to
have notified said Bates, and their failure to do so exonerates said
Bates from all liability. Refused.
8. If the custom of pledging such warehouse receipts as collateral upon which to raise money was not known among warehousemen, and said Bates had not notice of any such custom, then he is
not bound by it, and it did not prevent said Bates delivering said
lard to said Grant, and the transfer of such receipts to the bank
was not binding on said Bates. Refused.
11. If the bank claims the collaterals under the four notes dated
in August and September 1877, about eight months after the
receipts were issued, it was the duty of the bank to have first
inquired to ascertain if Bates was in Cincinnati accessible to them.
The lapse of time was such as to put the bank on inquiry about
the lard before they could hold Bates responsible.
Refused, as written, given as follows: "If these loans were made
at the date of the last notes; if they were original loans of that
date, and Grant had then presented the bank with these collaterals,
which had been given some eight months before that date, it was
the duty of the bank to make inquiry in regard to them before
taking them as security. If, however, they were renewals of
original notes, and the receipts had been pledged as collaterals to
the original notes, the renewals would carry the pledges with them
to the last note of such renewals."
Verdict for plaintiff, $8955.

United States District Court, District of Aew Jersey.
IN THE MATTER OF THE SCHOONER ELIZA B. EMOPY AND DANIEL
R. WEEKS, MASTER.
C., a part owner and master of a vessel, sold all his interest therein, including
what the parties denominated "the sailing right," to one W.
Afterwards, C. purchased a new interest in the same vessel, and, joining other part owners, who, in
the aggregate, constituted a majority, applied to the court, as the majority in interest, for the possession and control. Held,
(1) That the majority in interest of a ship were ordinarily entitled ,o the possession, and could appoint the master.
(2) That no such right was recognised in law as a sailing right, which one par*
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owner could sell and transfer to another part owner, against the will of the majority; and
(3) That notwithstanding this, one part owner could estop himself from obtaining
the aid of a court of admiralty to restore him to the possession, after he had received
a valuable consideration from another part owner for the right to sail the vessel.

THIS was a libel filed by John B. Clayton, Charles Lawrence,
Nicholas Clayton and Enoch B. Champion, owners of 17-32ds
of the schooner Eliza B. Emory, for the possession of the said
vessel, alleging that when the libellants became the owners of their
respective interests, one Daniel R. Weeks was the master in charge;
but desiring a change, and representing a majority of shares in said
schooner, they appointed John B. Clayton master, to navigate and
sail her, and applied to the said Weeks to deliver up the possession
of the papers and of the said vessel, which he refused to do.
The answer of Daniel R. Weeks, for himself and the remaining
owners, did not deny that the libellants represented a majority of
the shares in the ownership of the schooner, but claimed that he
ought not to be deprived of her command and management, for the
reason that in the month of April 1874, John B. Clayton, one of
the libellants, sold to him 1-16th part of said vessel for the price
of $1750, agreeing to give, and assuring the said Weeks that he
should have, the right to sail and manage her, if he would pay him
(Clayton) the sum of $1750 for said interest; that the value of the
16th did not exceed $500, and the excess, to wit, $1250, was
demanded by Clayton and paid by Weeks for the privilege of sailing the vessel as master; that Weeks also agreed at the same time
with the said Clayton to sail the schooner on what is known as
"quarter shares," Clayton assuring him (Weeks) that the owners
would not allow a larger interest for sailing; that Weeks sailed the
vessel on "quarter shares," but in fact another one-quarter interest
was also paid to another of the libellants, Nicholas. Clayton, a brother of John B. Clayton, who thus received for the earnings of the
vessel, during the time she has been sailed and managed by the
said Weeks, a sum of about $1800, without the knowledge of the
other owners, who were informed by the said John B. Clayton that
Weeks was sailing on "half shares."
S. H. Grey, for libellants.
H. B.

dmunds, for respondents.

NIxoN D. J.-The testimony shows that the libellant, John B.
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Clayton, was the master of the schooner from the time she was
built, in 1861, until he sold out his interest to the present master,
Weeks; that he was the owner of 3-32ds, and transferred at the
same time 2-32ds to Weeks and 1-32d to Nicholas Clayton; that
Weeks was then, and had been for some years before, the mate on
board the said vessel, and that Clayton was allowed more than the
real value of the shares on the agreement and promise that he
should succeed to the position of master.
The proctor for the libellants claims that the owners of a majority
of shares have the legal right to control the sailing and navigation
of the vessel, and that there is no such thing known in law as a
sailing or master's interest, which is capable of being transferred
from one person to another.
I think the correctness of these propositions must be admitted.
Whatever the prevailing opinion or practice amongst owners may
be to the contrary, it seems now to be generally understood that
the minority must submit to the will of the majority in the management and control of the vessel; that it may employ or dismiss the
master or crew at pleasure, and that no contract can be made
between two part owners, having minority interests, in reference to
the employment of the master, which will bind other owners not
parties to it: The New -Draper,4 C. Rob. 235; Ward v. Buckman, 36 N. Y. 26; Tke W. Bagaley, 5 Wall. 406.
But this is not quite the question which this case presents. If
the libellants represented a majority of the shares of the vessel,
without including John B. Clayton's interest, I should not hesitate
for a moment to order a decree in their favor for the possession.
But it is necessary to count him in order to constitute the majority,
and the question here is, whether it is competent for one part
owner to make an agreement or arrangement with another part
ownez, in regard to the management and control of the vessel, by
which he may be afterwards estopped from claiming the management and control himself.
It would not seem to be a difficult question to answer, if we may
apply to a case in admiralty the same principles that are applied to
a suit in equity, and I do not see why we should not be allowed to
do so. It is conceded that a court of admiralty is not a court of
equity. It may nevertheless decide a cause submitted to its cognisauce upon equitable principles. It has the capacity of a court of
equity in the matter of granting relief and of restraining a wrong
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when the rules of natural justice require a departure from strict
legal relief. See Ben. Ad., § 829.
Looking at the pleadings and proofs, and disregarding all facts
which are not set forth in the pleadings, I find that this is a cause
of possession, and that it has been brought to dispossess a master,
who is also part owner, without any allegations of incompetency,
unskilfulness or dishonesty on his part, but solely upon the ground
that the libellants represent a majority of the parties interested in
the schooner, and as such have the right to her possession and control. I find that, aggregating their interests, all the libellants own
17-32ds of the vessel, and that of these shares, John B. Clayton,
one of the libellants, is the owner of 10-82ds. I find that some
years ago, the said Clayton, being a part owner and the master,
made sale of his then interest to the respondent Weeks, whom the
libellants are endeavoring to dispossess, and that he received from
Weeks at the time a considerable sum of money for what the parties
thought was the "sailing right" of Clayton.
Should an admiralty court be made the instrumeat of aiding
him now to oust Weeks, and to resume possession and control,
because he has been able to buy in enough of the outstanding
shares of the vessel, to give him once more a majority? I should
not like to be a party to any such unconscionable endeavor, and am
glad that I do not find any principle of law that requires me to be
one.
It is conceded that a sailing right is not transferable, and that
no such right inhered to the shares, which Clayton sold to Weeks.
It may also be conceded that if a majority in interest of the owners,
irrespective of Clayton, claimed the possession, the court would
accede to their request, although no cause for the master's removal
were assigned. In saying this, I do not overlook the remark of
Sir WILLIAM SCOTT in The lVew Draper,supra, that "in the case
of the master and part owner, something more is required." (than
the mere expression of the will of the majority in interest), "before
the court will proceed to dispossess a person who is also a proprietor of the vessel, and whose possession, the common law, upon
general principles, is inclined to maintain." Nor do I forget, that
two of the ablest text-writers of this country (Story and Parsons),
have given their assent to the law as thus stated. See Story on
Part., § 445, and Parsons on Part. 562. But I think the later and
better opinion is, that the owners of the shares of a vessel are tenants

Ix

RE

SCHOONER ELIZA B. EMORY.

in common, and not partners, and that the logical sequence of such
tenancy is, that the majority in interest may displace the master at
their will, without cause assigned: Montgomery v. Wharton, 1
Dall. 49.
But conceding these things, may not a part owner, by his act
or conduct forfeit his right to complain of the possession of another
part owner? May he not by the acceptance of a consideration,
estop himself from the exercise of his undisputed right, under
ordinary circumstances to take the possession and control of a
vessel from the person who paid him the consideration for such
possession and control ? Although the doctrine of estoppel ordinarily rests upon the ground, that the law will not permit a party to
profit by his own fraud, is there not a class of cases, where a
person wholly innocent, in a moral point of view, may be bound
by his acts and sayings, where, if he be not bound, he will be permitted to cast an injury upon some one, as innocent as he, but who
has been misled by a confidence in what was said or done to him
with the intent that he should rely upon it? Parsons on Con.
801.
It may be asked, as it was at the hearing, how can one be
estopped by a contract which is void ?
The court enforces no contract and does not seek to do so. It
simply says to one of the part owners of a vessel, "You have placed
yourself in such a position in the performance of an illegal act, that
it is inequitable to allow you to repudiate your action and to do
something contrary to it, to the injury of another. It is true that
you had no 'sailing right' in the schooner which you could sell, but
you made one of the subordinates, employed by you in navigating
the vessel, believe that you had, and so induced him to pay you a
liberal sum of money for the privilege of becoming master. You
prefer no complaint that he does not faithfully perform his duties,
but with his money still in your pocket you claim the active aid of
the court, in dispossessing him and restoring you because you have
voluntarily purchased, or otherwise obtained the control of enough
shares, to enable you to represent the majority in interest of the
ownership."
I must hold, that until the majority in interest of the owners,
without including Clayton, join in the application, there should be
no decree for the libellants, and that the present libel be dismissed
with costs.

LOUISVILLE COFFIN CO. v. WARREN.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
LOUISVILLE COFFIN CO. v. L. L. WARREN

ET AL.

Where a building has been erected at a large expense and used for the same purpose for many years, a chancellor will not enjoin such use at the suit of an adjoining
owner, except in a plain case of nuisance and of irreparable injury.
fere inconvenience and annoyance, such as is incident to every case in which
manufacturing is carried on in a city, will not be sufficient ground for such injunction.
While a mere acquiescence in the existence of a nuisance for seven years, or even a
longer time, will not ordinarily preclude the party from abating it, still when one
stands by and permits the erection of buildings and their use for the purposes for
which they were constructed for seven years, it becomes very persuasive evidence
that the injury complained of is such as is incidental to like improvements and common to the whole surrounding popuiation.

from the Louisville Chancery Court.
This was a petition by residents of certain property in the city

APPEAL

of Louisville, praying for an injunction against defendants from
operating a factory, the smoke and cinders from which injured
complainants' property. An answer was filed and testimony taken.
The court below granted the injunction, whereupon defendants
appealed. The facts are fully stated in the opinion.
A. Casey and A. Duvall, for appellants.
H. C. Pindell and George M. .Davie, for appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRYOR, C. J.-This action was instituted by L. L. Warren and
others, in the Louisville Chancery Court, against the- Louisville
Coffin Company, alleging, in substance, that the issue of smoke,
soot and cinders from the smoke-stack of the defendants' factory is
a nuisance to the plaintiffs, who live in the vicinity of the factory,
and own the property in which they reside. They sought and
obtained an injunction in the action, and from that judgment this
appeal was taken.
The ground upon which the appellants' factory stands is in the
interior of the square bounded by Walnut, Third, Chestnut and
Fourth streets; Warren's residence is on the corner of Fourth and
Walnut; Pindell's residence is between Third and Fourth on Walnut; the latter is the owner also of two houses on Third street.
Warren and Pindell are the appellees here, and were the plaintiffs
below.
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Some four or five years prior to the institution of the action, the
appellants became the purchasers of a lease covering a part of the
ground within the square already described, and have erected upon
it valuable improvements in the way of buildings, in which has
been placed costly machinery for the execution of the work on
which they are engaged. The factory is a substantial brick building, three stories high, and the cost of its construction, including
the machinery, is not less than $15,000. The smoke-stack, of
which the complaint is made, was erected in the year 1870, and
has been in use since that date; is fifty-five feet in height, and
overlooks the buildings surrounding it. It is alleged in the petition that the machinery of the factory is propelled by steam, and
that a column of smoke, soot and burning embers pours almost
constantly from the smoke-stack, and frequently the smoke, soot
and cinders are carried by the wind over the premises of the plaintiffs, enveloping their windows and doors, and rendering the atmosphere unwholesome f6r respiration; that their buildings are in
danger from the burning embers, and their tenant-houses less valuable for rental, &c.; that the factory is located in the midst of a
square almost entirely occupied by buildings for residences and
light fancy stores ; that some of the buildings have taken fire from
the embers emanating from the smoke-stack, and the rates of insurance have been greatly increased.
These allegations are denied by the answer, and by way of
defence it is also alleged that a steam planing-mill was continuously operated on this ground for three years prior to the purchase
made by the appellants, and that appellants used the same steampower and smoke-stack in the mill and factory that had been used
on the leasehold during the last seven years past, and the volume
of smoke, soot, &c., was no greater than it had been during the
entire period. They allege the use of every precaution to prevent
an injury to appellees' property, and deny any other injury than
the annoyance that such buildings and machinery must necessarily
cause; that their property cannot be removed without destroying
its value, nor their business continued without the aid of steampower.
The depositions of many witnesses have been taken in the case,
and much conflicting testimony is presented in the record as to the
effect the operating of appellant's factory has on the adjacent property, as well as the extent of the injury and annoyance resulting
VOL. XXIII.-73
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to those who occupy residences on this square. The discomfort
produced by smoke, soot, &c., from the running of large factories
in cities, has not, 'perhaps, been exaggerated by those who have
testified; and with reference to the particular case, when looking
alone to the testimony offered by the appellees, it can scarcely
be maintained that the only injury sustained is the annoyance
usually incident to such buildings. This testimony, however, when
considered in connection with that offered by the appellant, leaves
the mind in doubt as to whether the parties complaining have sustained any substantial injury. The rule that "any interference
with our neighbor in the comfortable enjoyments of life is a wrong
which the law will redress," must be considered in its application
with reference to the condition in which the party has placed himself who is making the complaint. One living in a city must
necessarily submit to the annoyances which are incidental to a city
life. It must be recollected that manufacturing establishments
are necessary and indispensable to the growth and prosperity of
every city; and while the cleanliness and beauty of that part of a
city adorned by costly edifices may be marred by the erection of
the foundry or the machine-shop, and the comforts of life to some
extent interfered with by the hum and noise of machinery, still the
manufacturing interest, upon which its prosperity depends, requires
protection, and individual comfort must yield to the public good.
The testimony on the part of the appellees conduces to show much
annoyance and discomfort caused by the smoke and soot issuing
from the smoke-stack of appellant's factory, while, on the other
hand, it appears that appellants have used the modern appliances
for the consumption of smoke and the burning embers, so as to
insure the safety of the adjoining property and lessen the annoyances that are ordinarily caused to those living contiguous to such
establishments. The smoke-stack is in the rear of the buildings in
which the appellees live and a distance of near two hundred feet
from the front of either residence. The mouth of the stack is far
above their buildings, and has been continually used on the same
ground for seven years prior to the time at which the injunction
was granted. In May 1875, in order to remove the complaint
made in regard to the falling embers, all the steam was made to
escape through the stack, destroying in that manner the sparks
and burning embers. The factory is well managed, and the
allegeil nuisance is evidently no greater than is being caused to all
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who occupy residences near large factories operated by steam.
The appellees prior to 1875, may have had reason to anticipate
danger from the sparks and cinders that were occasionally emitted
from the mouth of the smoke-stack. Since that time a steam-pipe
having been inserted in the smoke-stack, the decided weight of the
testimony conduces to show that the steam dampens the soot and
embers, causing them to fall near the stack.
This factory cannot be regarded a greater nuisance than the other
manufacturing establishments within the city, using steam-power and
having smoke-stacks attached to their buildings. If the injunction
is made perpetual in this case, the precedent established would, in
effect, destroy the manufacturing interests in the city of Louisville.
The owners of family residences would, in most instances, object to
the erection or continuance of such factories adjoining their homes,
and if aided by the chancellor in having them removed, would
destroy all manufacturing interests, or require the location of such
buildings in a part of the city remote from the private residences of
the inhabitants. The location of such buildings within a city is a
mere question of policy by those controlling the municipal government; and the chancellor would be reluctant to interfere by injunction, except in cases where irreparable injury would result in the
absence of such relief. In this case the chancellor is asked to
restrain the appellants from operating a factory that has been running in the same locality for years without any serious damage to
the owners of the property adjacent, and where the effect is to
destroy entirely the business of the appellant; it would be more
equitable to interfere to prevent its construction than to permit the
expenditure and then destroy the value of the property by denying
to the appellants the right to use it. Whether or not a court of
equity would have prevented the erection of the building on the
ground that the part of the city in which it is located had been set
apart by common consent for private residences, is not necessary to
be determined. In this case the buildings have been erected and a
large expenditure made, amounting to $15,000 or $20,000. The
business in which appellants are engaged is lawful. It is not
shown that the health of the appellees or their families is affected
by it, or that the atmosphere is rendered unpleasant, except from
the smoke at certain periods when the wind is blowing in the direction of appellees' houses. This condition of things is realized in
nearly the entire central part of the city, all of the inhabitants being
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more or less annoyed by the smoke and soot settling on their
premises. The right of the chancellor to grant an injunction where
the injury is irreparable cannot be questioned, but on the facts of
this case this power should not have been executed. While a mere
acquiescence in the existence of a nuisance for seven years, or even
a longer time, will not ordinarily preclude the party from abating
it; still, when one stands by and permits the erection of buildings,
as in this case, and their use for the purposes for which they -were
constructed for seven years, it becomes very persuasive evidence
that the injury complained of is such as is incidental to like improvements and common to the entire population on this square. Some
of the residents find no evil results from the location and erection
of the factory, while others regard it as a nuisance. In the case of
Robinson v. Baugh, 31 Mich. 290, which goes further in sustaining
the judgment below than any case to which our attention has been
called, the opinion is based on the fact that the nuisance complained of caused substantial injury to the dwellings, and affected
not only the comfort but the health of the residents. Besides, the
defendant's works in that case had been in operation but a short
time, were not expensive or of a permanent character, and could be
removed without much inconvenience or cost.
In that case it is said: "Extreme claims must give way, and
men must yield somewhat in a spirit of accommodation and concession, and measurably recognise and respect the actual exigencies of
time, place and circumstances." The case of Rhodes v. Dunbar, 57
Penn. St. 274, is somewhat analogous to the case being considered.
That was a bill to restrain the owner of the property from reconstructing a planing-mill which had been destroyed by fire, and while being
operated had caused much annoyance and discomfort to the owners
of the adjacent property by reason of the smoke, soot and embers
issuing from the chimneys of the factory. The court discharged
the injunction, and one of the grounds assigned was that such
annoyances and inconveniences are incidental to city life.
In the present case the proof shows that with the escape of steam
through the smoke-stack the danger of fire is removed and the
annoyance greatly lessened, and much of the testimony introduced
by the appellees applies to the condition of the property previous
to the making of this improvement. We think in a case like this,
where the property has been used for the same purposes for a number of years, and expenditures made that if rendered useless must

